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India's Next Growth Strategy Across Energy, Trade and
Technology
Exclusive Conversation with Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman & Chief Executive,
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi
Interview
Indian Journal of Socio-Economic Studies
Vol I No 3 July – September 2026 page 56–59| | |
About the Interviewee: Sunjoy Joshi is Chairman and Chief Executive of the Observer Research
Foundation (ORF), New Delhi and Chairman of ORF America. A former Indian Administrative
Service officer of the Madhya Pradesh cadre (1983), he took premature retirement in 2009 to pursue
academic interests in energy, climate and development. He has been associated with the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London and Stanford University's Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development. His work focuses on technology, energy, development and global economic shifts.
Theme 1: Geography, Energy & Resilience
What does the return of geography as a source of
economic power mean for India's growth strategy over
the next decade, particularly when trade routes, energy
supplies and critical infrastructure can become strategic
vulnerabilities?
For almost three decades we had been living in a Fukuyama-
inspired dreamland. Geography had been solved: continental
distances erased by cheap shipping that connected open global
markets. As for security - that was something underwritten and
guaranteed by someone else. All fairytale assumptions from
which we are today rudely awakened into a world of fortresses
ruled by the law of the siege. He who can lay siege wins and
Geography too is a source of leverage. But it's not the only one:
whosoever controls a chokepoint, a strait, a currency or a
supply chain will price access to it, control how others use it.
For India, Hormuz is bad news. With crude-import
dependence at a record 88.7% in 2025–26 and roughly two-
thirds of that oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz, a single
chokepoint transmits a foreign conict directly into India's
ination and scal decit. To counter this trend our growth
strategy must shift. Prepare for the siege, build resilience. The
cheapest supplier is no longer the cheapest if it can be cut o.
Security of access must be priced alongside cost in every energy,
logistics and technology decision. It is no longer just about
diversifying sources, but building redundancy into routes,
treating strategic buers not as idle expense but as the
preconditions of stable growth. The winners of next decade
will be the ones who build for endurance.
How should India redesign its economic resilience when
the very networks that enable globalisation— shipping,
nance, technology and supply chains—can increasingly
be used as instruments of economic coercion?
In the real world we are waking into, interdependence by itself
does not imply a balance of power. The networks built for
eciency—the dollar-clearing system, the sea lane, the
semiconductor supply chain, can all be weaponised, made
instruments of pressure, by those who can switch them on and
o; by those who control the nodes. Redesigning for resilience
means refusing to be captured by any single network or
dependency. The governing principle being that redundancy is
not just insurance, it is leverage and only leverage balances
power. A second supplier, an alternative energy source or a
payment rail, a diversied route - these are not overheads; these
are the levers through which power can be exercised. The power
to negotiate rather than be forced to seek a permit. Concretely,
India should hold plural options at every chokepoint: multiple
choices for fuel; these include sovereign coal, nuclear, crude
and LNG with multiple suppliers along multiple routes;
settlement capacity in more than one currency; strategic
reserves in energy and critical minerals; and sovereign domestic
capacity in the technologies most easily weaponised. Autarky is
neither possible nor desirable for a large open economy,
therefore Atmnirbhar Bharat cannot be an autarky. The goal is
the planned avoidance of any single dependence deep enough
to be turned into a weapon. This is ultimately the foundation
of sovereignty - the ability to choose one's trade, nance and
foreign policy without seeking permission from another.
Editorial Note: This interview between Mahima Sharma, Interviewer and Sunjoy Joshi , Interviewee, is presented in a
question-and-answer format, lightly edited for clarity and coherence while preserving the substance and intent of the
interviewee's responses. The views expressed are those of the interviewee and do not represent the editorial position of the
Indian Journal of Socio-Economic Studies.
Interviewer: Mahima Sharma is an independent journalist with extensive experience across leading media platforms.
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Vol I No 3 July – September 2026| |
What should India do dierently over the next ten years
to ensure that dependence on global energy and
commodity markets does not translate into recurring
ination, scal pressure and slower growth?
For India one transmission belt is direct and well-documented:
India imports about 88% of its crude and the April–July 2026
import bill jumped roughly 57% year-on-year to $63.4 billion as
prices rose, even as volumes stayed at. Every dollar-per-barrel
rise widens the trade decit, pressures the rupee and feeds fuel,
freight and fertiliser costs into domestic prices. Breaking this
belt requires attacking demand and dependence together. First,
accelerate the shift of transport and industry onto domestic
electrons: India has crossed 300 GW of non-fossil capacity (over
54% of installed capacity, July 2026) and every unit of electried
transport is a barrel not imported through a strait. Second,
rethink the role of sovereign molecules like coal as a strategic
resource even as we continue to push our climate goals. Third,
treat strategic petroleum and fertiliser reserves as buers to
absorb price spikes; incentivise domestic exploration and
production and expand rening. Fourth, diversify suppliers and
settlement so no single disruption can dominate. We have been
plodding on nuclear. We must take it seriously and accelerate
the development and commercialisation of the three-stage
Thorium cycle as the long term route to our own sovereign
energy resource. The objective is to convert as many imported,
dollar-priced, molecules into home-generated molecules or
electrons. That is the only way to turn Oil, which has been our
recurring macro-vulnerability; into a manageable one.
Theme 2: Maritime Infrastructure &
Autonomy
How can India turn its geographical position in the
Indian Ocean into an economic advantage rather than
merely viewing maritime security through a strategic or
military lens?
India must re-imagine its geography. India has tended to tread
defensively, treating its geography as a security burden. From
seeing itself as a sub-continent island geographically by the
Himalayas and geo-politically by the Partition, India must
grow into a continental node that sits astride the sea lanes
through which most of the world's energy and a large share of
its trade pass. The opportunity is to read it as an indispensable
node of commerce. The same geography that must be
protected can be monetised: as a provider of maritime-domain
awareness, escort, insurance, bunkering and repair to the many
trading states that share and use these waters; as a rening and
storage hub that adds value to crude before it moves on; and as
the western anchor of connectivity corridors. Hormuz and
Bab-el-Mandab closures forced far more severe Product-
market disruptions that dwarfed the rise in crude prices. India
sits on reneries that have proved leverage that scale,
complexity and operational exibility bring. Rather than
stymie it we must expand the leverage and control it gives us
over product markets. The task is to build the ports, the
storage, the servicing capacity and the corridor links that
convert a position of vulnerability into one of indispensability.
Stop being mere topography and make the world need India's
waters, its ports, its terrain and services. Nations in the region
that can help keep a sea lane, a trade corridor, a pipeline open
earn not just economic rent but gain strategic weight.
What new infrastructure does India need to build if
future competitiveness will depend not simply on
producing goods cheaply, but on guaranteeing reliable
access to energy, logistics, nance and alternative trade
routes?
Competition is nudging everyone from the lowest unit cost to
the most reliable one and the infrastructure must follow. Four
priorities stand out.
First Energy. While oil and gas remain signicant through
this century the big shift in energy is to electrons powering
electrical grids. First, in the new world the energy base must
reside in the grid. How do we make a strong national grid
interconnected yet 'islandable' so that a cyber or kinetic attack
on one node cannot darken the whole. India already has 50% of
it as renewables. This is a distributed source; but its
contribution to the grid depends on massive battery/pumped
storage before these intermittent sources of energy are better
utilised.
Second Logistics: Security and commerce are not separate
ledgers. South Asia is at this very moment being forced by
Geography to come to terms with a terrain it cannot escape; it
must rise to the challenge. The International North-South
Transport Corridor and Chabahar and who knows maybe even
IMEC (should times settle) not only link the Indian Ocean to
Central Asia, Europe and Russia but also bypass congested sea-
lanes that can overnight be turned into chokepoints. Multiply
the nodes of connectivity. They don't substitute or compete
with each other but rather give alternatives.
Third finance: indigenous payment and settlement rails
(UPI, RuPay and rupee-settlement arrangements) that keep
transactions owing whenever access to Western (or Chinese)
networks is made conditional.
Fourth technology: domestic capacity in the inputs most
easily weaponised —semi-conductor chips, cells and wafers,
critical-mineral processing, telecom and grid-control
hardware. Each of these is a second option that converts
dependency into choice and that choice gives leverage. It is
about having the power to refuse to say no.
How should India balance strategic autonomy with deep
economic interdependence when complete self-reliance is
neither realistic nor necessarily desirable for a $5-trillion-
plus economy?
Autarky is a pipedream. Therefore, Atmnirbharta is not a slogan
– it requires the discipline to not waste capital chasing an
impossible independence. Strategic autonomy ultimately means
Indian Journal of Socio-Economic Studies
58
never being held captive by a single dependence. A large open
economy like India has to trade deeply with others. India's
growth relies on imported energy, technology and capital. To do
that no single relationship can become total. There is a
distinction between diversication and decoupling. Decoupling
is costly and often impossible; diversication is aordable and is
the essence of autonomy. In practice this means holding plural
suppliers, plural routes and plural settlement currencies, so that
India retains the ability to walk away.
To walk away is what turns a supplicant into a negotiator
and makes for strategic autonomy. It means being Sovereign
enough to engage every major economy on merits and refuse to
join any exclusive bloc that forecloses the others. It also means
investing at home or with allies in specic capacities (critical
minerals, strategic fuels, sensitive technologies) where
adversarial cut-o would be catastrophic. Autonomy needs a
portfolio approach - balanced and wide enough so that no
single counterparty can dictate terms and threaten collapse.
Theme 3: Global Fragmentation & Resilience
What opportunities could this fragmentation of
globalisation create for India in manufacturing, logistics,
energy trading, nancial services and global supply
chains? And what must India change domestically to
capture them?
Read the current fragmentation not merely as a threat, but as
the reallocation of opportunity. As countries globally de-risk
from single-country dependence, India can become the
credible second source in electronics, pharmaceuticals and
clean-energy components. As trade reroutes around
chokepoints, India can oer rening, storage and tranship-
ment hubs : adding value to energy that moves through its
waters and becoming a node for new overland corridors to
Central Asia. In nance, its digital public infrastructure (UPI,
RuPay) positions it to oer settlement rails to partners wary of
concentration in any one system. And a fast-growing clean-
energy base, 300 GW of non-fossil capacity, solar taris down
nearly 80% in a decade, can allow it to trade green electrons and
derivatives such as hydrogen and ammonia, regionally. To
capture this, three domestic changes matter most: reliable,
aordable power and logistics so factories run uninterrupted;
faster clearances so investment lands; and regulation that
facilitates rather than polices. We need greater domestic
capacity across wafers, critical minerals but markets will not be
able to localise these unaided. The window is open but it is
open to many in Asia, Africa and Latin America because others
are de-risking. So it is going to be a competitive space which can
be captured only by the countries that can remove the systemic
friction that makes it dicult to build at scale.
How can India reduce the risk that future external shocks
are transmitted from energy and commodity markets
into household ination, employment, MSMEs and
overall economic growth?
The pass-through runs through fuel, freight and fertiliser and it
lands hardest on households and small rms. When Brent
spikes (the Indian basket touched $113 in March 2026 during
the West Asia conict) transport, food and input costs rise
within weeks and MSMEs, with thin margins and little hedging
capacity, are the rst to be hit. Reducing this risk means
widening the buers between the world price and the domestic
one. Larger strategic reserves let the state smooth a spike rather
than pass it through immediately. Rationalise taxes on
imported fuels and products so that they are not treated as cash
cows to generate revenue but as ex mechanisms to ride out
spikes. The goal is to convert a sharp, immediate, regressive
shock into a gradual, absorbable one.
Electrication of transport and cooking, backed by
doubling of the 300 GW of non-fossil capacity and near-
universal LPG access, can steadily shrink the share of the
household budget exposed to an imported, dollar-priced
molecule. China built 80% of its urea capacity on domestic coal
rather than natural gas because it needed to plan resilience to
insulate its farm sector.
What kind of international economic architecture should
India work towards if the post-Cold War model of
increasingly open and rules-based globalisation is giving
way to competing spheres of inuence and negotiated
arrangements?
The changes we are seeing are structural. The open, rules-based
system is not returning in the form we knew it; what replaces it
is a patchwork of negotiated, plural arrangements. India's
interest is neither to mourn the old order nor to nd itself
conscripted into an exclusive bloc, but to help build a genuinely
multipolar architecture in which middle powers can be rule-
makers, not rule-takers.
• That means investing in plural, interoperable systems
rather than betting on any one.
• That implies multiple trade agreements rather than a
single alignment; interoperable payment and settlement
rails rather than dependence on one clearing system; and
reformed multilateral bodies (trade, nance, energy)
that reect today's distribution of power rather than
1945's.
• It also means coalitions of the similarly exposed: import-
dependent economies pooling reserves, coordinating on
chokepoint security and sharing standards, so that no
single great power dictates terms to them individually.
The organising idea is redundancy at the level of the system
itself - enough plural institutions so that the failure or
weaponisation of any one does not leave a nation stranded.
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Vol I No 3 July – September 2026| |
India is large enough to matter and therefore needs to be
unaligned enough to be trusted across the emerging divides. If
it can do so it is well placed to be an architect of exactly such an
order.
Theme 4: Financial Sovereignty & Leverage
How important will alternative payment systems, digital
infrastructure and nancial connectivity become for
India's economic sovereignty, particularly if access to
global nancial networks itself becomes strategically
conditional?
Alternative payments systems are shifting from convenience to
necessity. With weaponisation of clearing systems such as
SWIFT the nancial network has itself become a chokepoint:
access to dollar-clearing and messaging systems can be made
conditional or withdrawn. This turns a plumbing system into
an instrument of command and control. Every nation engaged
in cross-border transactions must pass through a digital
chokepoint it does not control. That in eect hands over part of
its sovereignty to another.
India is unusually well placed to respond, having built the
world's leading digital public infrastructure - UPI for domestic
payments, RuPay and the rails for rupee-based and local-
currency settlement with willing partners. The strategic task is
to extend and internationalise these: to make rupee settlement
available where trade balances permit, to interlink with partner
countries' systems and to keep domestic payments fully
sovereign and resilient to external disruption. It is not that
existing global networks are to be abandoned. As long as their
eciency permits and they remain unconditional, there will
always be a case for using them. But to hold and use a working
alternative ensures that conditional access to any one system
only becomes an inconvenience, not a stranglehold. That
leverage also serves to keep the rst one honest.
What should India learn from the emergence of countries
such as Türkiye as energy and trade intermediaries? Can
India similarly position itself as a bridge between com-
peting economic regions rather than simply as a large
end-market?
Türkiye's lesson is that geography, actively worked upon, gives
not just revenue but geo-political relevance. Straddling routes
between producers and consumers, it actively made itself a
corridor, a rener and a natural gas hub whose cooperation all
sides courted. India can do the same on a larger canvas. As the
world's third-largest oil importer and a major rener with some
of the most complex reneries in the world, it takes discounted
crude, processes it and re-exports rened products.
India's reners not just add value, they function as critical
nodes in global product markets. We must not underestimate
the importance of that role and expand rather than constrain it.
The next stage would be to extend this bridging role: as the
western terminus of corridors linking the Indian Ocean to
Central Asia and Russia; as a rening, storage and green-fuel
hub for the wider region; and as a provider of digital and
nancial rails across divides.
I have already highlighted the value of multiple corridors –
the value lies in their redundancy and redundancy gives
leverage. The distinction that matters is between being a passive
end-market, valued only for what it buys and being the node,
valued for the assured access and services it provides. The more
it functions in that capacity the harder it becomes to coerce.
Build to scale and its relationships across rival blocs make it a
natural intermediary.
Looking towards 2035, what are the three structural
decisions India must take today to ensure that a more
fragmented and unpredictable global economy becomes
an opportunity for Indian prosperity rather than a
constraint on it?
Three decisions, taken now, compound over the decade.
First, treat resilience as an investment, not a cost. Build the
diversied routes with partners and gather them into the plural
settlement systems that collectively allow them and India to
absorb shocks and negotiate from strength. Resilience is what
separates a price-setter from a price-taker.
Second, decisively electrify the economy on domestic
power. Every barrel replaced by a home-generated electron
subtracts from an 88%-import-dependent vulnerability;
doubling the 300 GW of non-fossil capacity, with storage and a
hardened grid, converts an imported macro-risk into a
domestic, manageable one.
Third, invest in sovereign digital and nancial infrastruc-
ture and in the upstream industrial capacity - critical minerals,
semiconductors, clean-energy components – so that others
cannot weaponise them against you.
The through-line is a single idea: sovereignty in this era is
not self-suciency but the deliberate refusal to be captured by
any single dependence. A fortress world will punish the
exposed and reward the ones who plan for endurance.
REFERENCES
PPAC / Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas (import dependence
88.7%, 2025-26).
Analytical framework: my paper “the Cartaz Remix” and the
forthcoming series for ORF on “Reclaiming Sovereignty” .
PPAC import bill (Apr–Jul 2026, +57%, $63.4bn).
Analytical framework: ORF “Reclaiming Sovereignty” series.
Analytical framework: ORF “Reclaiming Sovereignty” series
(monetary architecture).
About Interviewer
Mahima Sharma
Mahima Sharma is an accomplished independent journalist with over two decades of experience across leading media
platforms. Transitioning from a PR professional to journalism in 2004, she has built a strong presence across print,
television and digital media.
Email: media@indiastat.com