
57
Vol I No 3 July – September 2026| |
What should India do dierently over the next ten years
to ensure that dependence on global energy and
commodity markets does not translate into recurring
ination, scal pressure and slower growth?
For India one transmission belt is direct and well-documented:
India imports about 88% of its crude and the April–July 2026
import bill jumped roughly 57% year-on-year to $63.4 billion as
prices rose, even as volumes stayed at. Every dollar-per-barrel
rise widens the trade decit, pressures the rupee and feeds fuel,
freight and fertiliser costs into domestic prices. Breaking this
belt requires attacking demand and dependence together. First,
accelerate the shift of transport and industry onto domestic
electrons: India has crossed 300 GW of non-fossil capacity (over
54% of installed capacity, July 2026) and every unit of electried
transport is a barrel not imported through a strait. Second,
rethink the role of sovereign molecules like coal as a strategic
resource even as we continue to push our climate goals. Third,
treat strategic petroleum and fertiliser reserves as buers to
absorb price spikes; incentivise domestic exploration and
production and expand rening. Fourth, diversify suppliers and
settlement so no single disruption can dominate. We have been
plodding on nuclear. We must take it seriously and accelerate
the development and commercialisation of the three-stage
Thorium cycle as the long term route to our own sovereign
energy resource. The objective is to convert as many imported,
dollar-priced, molecules into home-generated molecules or
electrons. That is the only way to turn Oil, which has been our
recurring macro-vulnerability; into a manageable one.
Theme 2: Maritime Infrastructure &
Autonomy
How can India turn its geographical position in the
Indian Ocean into an economic advantage rather than
merely viewing maritime security through a strategic or
military lens?
India must re-imagine its geography. India has tended to tread
defensively, treating its geography as a security burden. From
seeing itself as a sub-continent island geographically by the
Himalayas and geo-politically by the Partition, India must
grow into a continental node that sits astride the sea lanes
through which most of the world's energy and a large share of
its trade pass. The opportunity is to read it as an indispensable
node of commerce. The same geography that must be
protected can be monetised: as a provider of maritime-domain
awareness, escort, insurance, bunkering and repair to the many
trading states that share and use these waters; as a rening and
storage hub that adds value to crude before it moves on; and as
the western anchor of connectivity corridors. Hormuz and
Bab-el-Mandab closures forced far more severe Product-
market disruptions that dwarfed the rise in crude prices. India
sits on reneries that have proved leverage that scale,
complexity and operational exibility bring. Rather than
stymie it we must expand the leverage and control it gives us
over product markets. The task is to build the ports, the
storage, the servicing capacity and the corridor links that
convert a position of vulnerability into one of indispensability.
Stop being mere topography and make the world need India's
waters, its ports, its terrain and services. Nations in the region
that can help keep a sea lane, a trade corridor, a pipeline open
earn not just economic rent but gain strategic weight.
What new infrastructure does India need to build if
future competitiveness will depend not simply on
producing goods cheaply, but on guaranteeing reliable
access to energy, logistics, nance and alternative trade
routes?
Competition is nudging everyone from the lowest unit cost to
the most reliable one and the infrastructure must follow. Four
priorities stand out.
First Energy. While oil and gas remain signicant through
this century the big shift in energy is to electrons powering
electrical grids. First, in the new world the energy base must
reside in the grid. How do we make a strong national grid
interconnected yet 'islandable' so that a cyber or kinetic attack
on one node cannot darken the whole. India already has 50% of
it as renewables. This is a distributed source; but its
contribution to the grid depends on massive battery/pumped
storage before these intermittent sources of energy are better
utilised.
Second Logistics: Security and commerce are not separate
ledgers. South Asia is at this very moment being forced by
Geography to come to terms with a terrain it cannot escape; it
must rise to the challenge. The International North-South
Transport Corridor and Chabahar and who knows maybe even
IMEC (should times settle) not only link the Indian Ocean to
Central Asia, Europe and Russia but also bypass congested sea-
lanes that can overnight be turned into chokepoints. Multiply
the nodes of connectivity. They don't substitute or compete
with each other but rather give alternatives.
Third finance: indigenous payment and settlement rails
(UPI, RuPay and rupee-settlement arrangements) that keep
transactions owing whenever access to Western (or Chinese)
networks is made conditional.
Fourth technology: domestic capacity in the inputs most
easily weaponised —semi-conductor chips, cells and wafers,
critical-mineral processing, telecom and grid-control
hardware. Each of these is a second option that converts
dependency into choice and that choice gives leverage. It is
about having the power to refuse to say no.
How should India balance strategic autonomy with deep
economic interdependence when complete self-reliance is
neither realistic nor necessarily desirable for a $5-trillion-
plus economy?
Autarky is a pipedream. Therefore, Atmnirbharta is not a slogan
– it requires the discipline to not waste capital chasing an
impossible independence. Strategic autonomy ultimately means